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Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) allows a set of agents to collaboratively train a model in a
decentralized fashion without sharing their potentially sensitive data. This makes FL
suitable for privacy-preserving applications. At the same time, FL is susceptible to
adversarial attacks due to decentralized and unvetted data. One important line of attacks
against FL is the backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary tries to embed a
backdoor trigger functionality to the model during training which can later be activated
to cause a desired misclassification. To prevent such backdoor attacks, we propose a
lightweight defense that requires no change to the FL structure. At a high level, our
defense is based on carefully adjusting the server’s learning rate, per dimension, at each
round based on the sign information of agent’s updates. We first conjecture the necessary
steps to carry a successful backdoor attack in FL setting, and then, explicitly formulate
the defense based on our conjecture. Through experiments, we provide empirical
evidence to the support of our conjecture. We test our defense against backdoor attacks
under different settings, and, observe that either backdoor is completely eliminated, or its
accuracy is significantly reduced. Overall, our experiments suggests that our approach
significantly outperforms some of the recently proposed defenses in the literature. We
achieve this by having minimal influence over the accuracy of the trained models.
1 Introduction
Federated learning (FL) [1] has been recently introduced as a decentralized and distributed machine
learning protocol. Through FL, a set of agents can collaboratively train a model without sharing their
data with each other or any other third party. This makes FL suitable to settings where enhancing data
privacy is desired. In that regard, FL differs from the traditional distributed learning setting in which data
is first centralized, and then distributed to the agents [2, 3].
At the same time, FL has been shown to be susceptible to backdoor attacks [4, 5]. In a backdoor
attack, an adversary disturbs the training process to make the model learn a targeted misclassification
functionality [6, 7, 8]. In centralized setting, this is typically done by data poisoning. For example, in
a classification task involving cars and planes, the adversary could label all blue cars in the training data
as plane in an attempt to make the model to classify blue cars as planes at the inference/test phase. In
FL, since the data is decentralized, it is unlikely that an adversary could access all the training data. Thus,
backdoor attacks are carried through model poisoning in the FL context [4, 5, 9]. That is, the adversary
tries to constructs an update that encodes the backdoor in such a way that, when it is aggregated with
other agents’ updates, the aggregated model exhibits the backdoor.
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In this work, we study backdoor attacks against deep neural networks in the FL setting, and formulate a
defense based on carefully adjusting the learning rate of the aggregation used during the training process.
Basically, we show that adjusting the learning rate based on the super-majority of the sign of the updates sent
by the agents provides significantly better protection against various backdoor attacks compared to recent
defenses reported in the literature. Furthermore, we show that the proposed robust learning rate scheme con-
verges in non-i.i.d. settings where each agent has data coming from different but overlapping distributions.
In addition, we provide empirical evidence justifying the effectiveness of the proposed approach. In short, to
our knowledge, this is the first work that provides defense against the known backdoor attacks in FL setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the necessary background to the
reader. In Section 3, we explain our defense, and in Section 4, we illustrate the performance of our defense
under different experimental settings. Finally, in Section 5, we provide a few concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Federated Learning (FL)
At a high level, FL is multi-round protocol between a central server and a set of agents in which agents
jointly train a model. Formally, participating agents try to minimize the average of their loss functions,
arg min
w∈Rd
f(w) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
fk(w),
where fk is the loss function of kth agent. For example, for neural networks, fk is typically empirical
risk minimization under a loss function L such as cross-entropy, i.e.,
fk(w) =
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
L(xi, yi;w),
with nk being the total number of samples in agent’s dataset and (xi, yi) being the ith sample.
Concretely, FL protocol is executed as follows: at round t, server samples a subset of agents St, and sends
them wt, the model weights for the current round. Upon receiving wt, kth agent initializes his model with
the received weight and train for some number of iterations, e.g., via stochastic gradient descent (SGD),
and ends up with weights wkt . The agent then computes his update as ∆
k
t = w
k
t −wt and sends it back
to the server. Upon receiving the update of every agent in St, server computes the weights for the next
round by aggregating the updates with an aggregation function g : R|St|×d → Rd and adding the result
to wt. That is, wt+1 = wt + η · g({∆t}) where {∆t} =
⋃
k∈St ∆
k
t and η is the server’s learning rate.
For example, original FL paper [1] and many subsequent papers on FL [4, 5, 9, 10, 11] consider weighted
averaging to aggregate updates. In this context, this aggregation is referred as Federated Averaging
(FedAvg), and yields the following update rule,
wt+1 = wt + η
∑
k∈St nk ·∆kt∑
k∈St nk
. (1)
In practice, rounds can go on indefinitely, as new agents can keep joining the system, or until the model
reaches some desired performance metric (e.g., accuracy) on a validation dataset maintained by the server.
2.2 Backdoor Attacks andModel Poisoning
Training time attacks against machine learning models can roughly be classified into two categories:
targeted [4, 5, 6, 8] and untargeted attacks [12, 13]. In untargeted attacks, the adversarial task is to make
the model converge to a sub-optimal minima or to make the model completely diverge. Such attacks have
been also referred as convergence attacks and they are easily detectable to some extend by observing the
model’s accuracy on a validation data.
On the other hand, in targeted attacks, adversary wants the model to misclassify only a set of chosen
samples with minimally affecting its performance on the main task. Such targeted attacks are also known
as backdoor attacks. A prominent way of carrying backdoor attacks is through trojans [6, 8]. A trojan
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is a carefully crafted pattern that is leveraged to cause the desired misclassification. For example, consider
a classification task over cars and planes and let the adversarial task be making the model classify blue
cars as planes. Then, adversary could craft a brand logo, put it on some the blue car samples in the training
dataset, and only mislabel those as planes. Then, potentially, model would learn to classify blue cars with
the brand logo as planes. At the inference time, adversary can present a blue car sample with the logo
to the model to leverage the backdoor. Ideally, since the model would behave correctly on blue cars that
do not have the trojan, it would not be possible to detect the backdoor on a clean validation dataset.
In FL, the training data is decentralized and the aggregation server is only exposed to model updates.
Given that, backdoor attacks are typically carried by constructing malicious updates. That is, adversary
tries to create an update that encodes the backdoor in a way such that, when it is aggregated with other
updates, the aggregated model exhibits the backdoor. This has been referred as model poisoning attack
[4, 5, 9]. For example, an adversary could control some of the participating agents in a FL instance and
train their local models on trojaned datasets to construct malicious updates.
2.3 Robust Aggregation Methods
Several works have explored using techniques from robust statistics to deter attacks in FL. At a high level,
these works tried replacing averaging with robust estimators1 such as coordinate-wise median, geometric
median, α-trimmed mean, or a variant/combination of such techniques [15, 16, 12, 17]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the primary aim of these defenses are to deter convergence attacks.
In contrast, a recent work [9] has shown FedAvg can be made robust against backdoor attacks in some
settings when its coupled with weight-clipping and noise addition as introduced in [11]. Concretely, server
inspects updates, and if the L2 norm of an update exceeds a threshold M , server clips the update by
dividing it with an appropriate scalar. Server then aggregates clipped updates and adds Gaussian noise
to the aggregation. In this case, the update rule can be written as,
wt+1 = wt + η
(∑
k∈St
nk · ∆
k
t
max(1,‖∆kt ‖2/M)∑
k∈St
nk
+N (0, σ2M2)
)
(2)
Finally in [13], authors develop a communication efficient, distributed SGD protocol in which agents
only communicate the signs of their gradients. In this case, server aggregates the received signs and returns
the sign of aggregation to the agents who locally update their models using it. We refer their aggregation
technique as sign aggregation, and in FL setting, it yields the following update rule,
wt+1 = wt + η
(
sgn
∑
k∈St
sgn(∆kt )
)
. (3)
Although authors show their approach is robust against certain adversaries who carry convergence attacks,
e.g., by sending random signs, or by negating the signs of their gradients, in Section 4, we show that it
is susceptible against backdoors attacks.
3 Robust Learning Rate
Backdoor Task vs Main Task While carrying the backdoor attack, the adversary tries to steer the
parameters of the model to wadv, which ideally minimizes the loss on both the main and the backdoor
attack tasks. At the same time, an honest agent would try to move the model parameters towards whon
that only minimizes the loss on main task. Our main conjecture is that, assuming whon and wadv are
different points, the updates that are sent by honest agents and adversarial agents will most likely differ
in the directions they specify. As we show next, assuming a bound on the number of adversarial agents,
we can ensure the model moves away from wadv, and moves toward whon, by tuning the server’s learning
rate based on sign information of updates.
1Informally, a statistical estimator is said to be robust if it cannot be skewed arbitrarily in presence of outliers [14].
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Robust learning rate (RLR) Following that insights, we construct a defense which we denote as robust
learning rate (RLR) by extending the approach proposed in [13]. In order to move the model towards
a particular direction, for each dimension, we require a sufficient number of votes, in form of signs of
the updates. In addition, we introduce a hyperparameter called learning threshold. For every dimension
where the sum of signs of updates is less than this threshold, the learning rate is multiplied by -1, in order
to maximize the loss on that dimension rather than minimizing it. That is, with a learning threshold of
θ, the learning rate for the ith dimension is given by,
ηθ,i =
{
η
∣∣∑
k∈St sgn(∆
k
t )
∣∣ ≥ θ
−η otherwise (4)
For example, consider FedAvg and let ηθ denote the learning rate vector over all dimensions, i.e.,
[ηθ,1, ηθ,2, . . . , ηθ,d]
>. Then, the update rule with robust learning rate simply becomes
wt+1 = wt + ηθ 
∑
k∈St nk ·∆kt∑
k∈St nk
, (5)
where  is the element-wise product operation. Note that, since we only adjust the learning rate, this
approach is agnostic to the aggregation function. For example, we can trivially combine it with update
clipping and noise addition as in Equation 2.
To see how this might help to maximize adversary’s loss, consider a simple example where the local training
consist of a single epoch of full-batch gradient descent. In this case, update of kth agent is just the negative of
his gradients, i.e., ∆kt = w
k
t −wt = (wt−∇fk(wt))−wt = −∇fk(wt). Then, aggregated update is just
the average of negative of agent’s gradients, i.e.,−gavg. Therefore, if sum of the signs at a dimension i is be-
low θ, that dimension is updated aswt,i = wt,i+η·gavg,i. Otherwise, it is updated aswt,i = wt,i−η·gavg,i.
So we see that, for dimensions where the sum of signs is below θ, we are moving towards the direction of gra-
dient , and hence, attempting to maximize loss. For other dimensions, we are moving towards the negative
of gradient and attempting to minimize the loss as usual. Therefore, assuming number of adversarial agents
is sufficiently below θ, the model would try to move away fromwadv, and would try to move towardswhon.
4 Experiments
In this section, we first illustrate the performance of our defense, and then provide some empirical
justification for its effectiveness via experiments.
The general setting of our experiments are as follows: we simulate FL for R rounds among K agents
where F of them are corrupt. The backdoor task is to make the model misclassify instances from a base
class as target class by using trojan patterns. That is, a model having the backdoor classifies instances
from base class with trojan pattern as target class (see Figure 1). To do so, we assume an adversary who
corrupts the local datasets of corrupt agents by adding a trojan pattern to P fraction of base class instances
and re-labeling them as target class. Other than that, adversary cannot view and modify updates of honest
agents, or cannot influence the computation done by honest agents and the aggregation server. At each
round, the server uniformly samples C ·K agents for training where C ≤ 1. Those agents locally train
forE epochs with a batch size ofB before sending their updates. Upon receiving and aggregating updates,
we measure three key performance metrics on validation data: validation accuracy, base class accuracy
and backdoor accuracy. Validation and base class accuracies are computed on the validation data that
comes with the used datasets, and the backdoor accuracy is computed on a poisoned validation data that is
constructed by (i) extracting all base class instances from the original validation data, and (ii) adding them
the trojan pattern and re-labeling them as the target class. We measure the performance of the following four
aggregation methods: (i) FedAvg (equation 1), (ii) FedAvg with RLR (equation 5), (iii) coordinate-wise
median (comed) and (iv) sign aggregation (equation 3). We also measure the performance of these
aggregations under combination of weight-clipping and noise addition as in equation 2. Furthermore, in
Appendix B, we provide results when comed and sign aggregation are combined with RLR.
When there is a L2 norm thresholdM on updates, we assumeM is public and every agent runs projected
gradient descent to minimize their losses under this restriction, i.e., an agent ensures his update’s L2
norm is bounded by M by monitoring the L2 norm of his model during training and clips its weights
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appropriately. Finally we use the same model in [9], a 5-layer convolutional neural network consisting
of about 1.2M parameters with the following architecture: two layers of convolution, followed by a
layer of max-pooling, followed by two fully-connected layers with dropout. Hyperparameters used in
all experiments can be found in Appendix A.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Samples from trojaned base classes and corresponding target classes. Trojan pattern is a 5-by-5
plus sign that is put to the top-left of objects. For i.i.d. case (a), backdoor task is to make model classify
trojaned sandals as sneakers. For non-i.i.d. case (b), it is to make model classify trojaned digit 1s as digit 7s.
Note that original images are in grayscale, these figures are normalized as they appear in training/validation
dataset. We also repeat the experiments we present here under three more different trojan patterns and
report the results in Appendix B.
4.1 IID Setting
We start with a setting where data is distributed in i.i.d. fashion among agents. Concretely, we use the Fash-
ion MNIST [18] dataset, and give each agent an equal number of samples from the training data via uniform
sampling. In Figure 2, we compare FedAvg and FedAvg with RLR, and in Figure 3 we plot the perfor-
mances for comed and sign aggregations. In Table 1, we report the final accuracies reached in each setting.
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Figure 2: Plots for FedAvg and FedAvg with RLR in i.i.d. setting. From left-to-right: (a) FedAvg, (b)
FedAvg with RLR, (c) FedAvg under clipping&noise, (d) FedAvg with RLR under clipping&noise. As
can be seen, FedAvg is weak against the attack even with clipping&noise. On the other hand, FedAvg
with RLR prevents the backdoor with or without clipping&noise. Using clipping and noise addition could
be a desirable property in contexts where differential privacy is applied, or against attackers who try to
make the model diverge by sending arbitrarily large values.
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Figure 3: Plots for comed and sign aggregations in i.i.d. setting. From left-to-right: (a) comed, (b) comed
under clipping&noise, (c) sign aggregation, (d) sign aggregation under clipping&noise. We see that
both comed and sign aggregation are susceptible against backdoor attack and fail to prevent it even when
combined with clipping&noise.
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Aggregation M σ Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 1 93.5 98.5
FedAvg 0 0 100 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 4 1e-3 100 93.2 99.1
Comed 0 0 100 92.8 99.0
Comed 4 1e-3 99.5 92.8 98.4
Sign 0 0 100 92.9 98.7
Sign 4 1e-3 99.7 93.1 98.6
FedAvg with RLR 0 0 0 92.9 98.3
FedAvg with RLR 4 1e-3 0.5 92.2 97.4
Table 1: Final backdoor, validation and base class accuracies for different aggregations in i.i.d. setting.
Lowest backdoor, highest validation and base class accuracies are highlighted in bold. FedAvg*
corresponds to our baseline where we use FedAvg with no attackers. See Appendix B for additional
experiments under different combinations ofM and σ, and our justification for the chosen values.
4.2 Non-IID Setting
We now move on to a more realistic setting for FL in which data is non-i.i.d. distributed among agents.
For this setting, we use the Federated EMNIST dataset from the LEAF benchmark [19]. In this dataset,
digits 0-9 are distributed across 3383 users and each user has possibly a different distribution over digits.
Similar to the i.i.d. case, we compare FedAvg and FedAvg with RLR (Figure 4), and plot the performances
for comed and sign aggregations (Figure 5). Table 2 reports the final accuracies for each setting.
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Figure 4: Plots for FedAvg and FedAvg with RLR in non-i.i.d. setting. From left-to-right: (a) FedAvg,
(b) FedAvg with RLR, (c) FedAvg under clipping&noise, (d) FedAvg with RLR under clipping&noise.
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Figure 5: Plots for comed and sign aggregations. From left-to-right: (a) comed, (b) comed under
clipping&noise, (c) sign aggregation, (d) sign aggregation under clipping&noise.
4.3 Removing Backdoor During Training
During experiments, we observed that, FedAvg with RLR rate performs substantially better than other
methods in terms of preventing the backdoor task, but it also reduces convergence speed. Therefore, we
wonder if one can start without RLR, and then switch to RLR at some point during the training, e.g., when
the model is about to converge, to clean any possible backdoors from the model. Our experiments indicate
that this is the case as illustrated by Figure 6. Results suggest that one can start without RLR and later
switch to RLR when the model is about to converge, and/or a backdoor attack is suspected, to clean the
model of backdoor during training. Overall, this improves the time to convergence when compared to
using RLR right from the beginning.
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Aggregation M σ Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 21.1 98.6 99.1
FedAvg 0 0 99.3 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 99.2 98.0 98.7
Comed 0 0 82.3 96.3 98.4
Comed 0.5 1e-3 95.2 95.5 98.1
Sign 0 0 99.8 97.6 98.7
Sign 0.5 1e-3 99.7 97.8 98.5
FedAvg with RLR 0 0 3.4 94.8 97.6
FedAvg with RLR 0.5 1e-3 0.4 93.2 97.7
Table 2: Final backdoor, validation and base class accuracies for different aggregations in non-i.i.d. setting.
Our comments for Table 1 apply to here too.
(a) IID setting (b) Non-IID setting, θ = 7 (c) Non-IID setting, θ = 8
Figure 6: Cleaning the backdoor during training by activating the RLR when the model is about to converge.
For i.i.d. setting, we activate the RLR when the model’s validation accuracy is above 93%. This occurs
at round 41, and at that round, backdoor accuracy is at 100%. At round 124, the backdoor accuracy is
0% with a validation accuracy of 93.1%. Final validation and base class accuracies are 92.8% and 98.5%
respectively. On the other hand, for non-i.i.d. setting, we activate RLR when the validation accuracy is above
97%. However in (b), we observe that using the same RLR threshold (7) that we used in Section 4.2 fails to
prevent the backdoor now. Backdoor accuracy falls to 2% from 99% and then rises up to 45% by round 500.
Yet, if we increase the threshold to 8, we observe it performs substantially better in (c). In this case, final
backdoor accuracy is 1.4%, and final validation and base class accuracies are 93.4% and 97%, respectively.
4.4 Analyzing Our Defense via Parameter and Feature Attributions
We now aim to explain why our defense works and provide some empirical justification for its effectiveness.
First, recall our conjecture from Section 3 where we basically argue that the adversary has to overcome the
influence of honest agents to embed the backdoor to model. More concretely, in our scenario, adversary
tries to map the base class instances with trojan pattern to the target class (adversarial mapping) where as
honest agents try to map them to the base class (honest mapping). If we had a way to quantify the influence
of agents on the model, regarding the mapping of trojaned inputs, we would expect the model to exhibit the
backdoor if the influence of adversary is greater than of the total influence of honest agents. Given that, we
designed a simple experiment to quantify the influence of agents, and test this conjecture empirically. In the
interest of space, we defer the details of this experiment to Appendix C, but we note that it is mainly based
on doing parameter attribution on the model to find out which parameters are most important to adversar-
ial/honest mapping, and then tracking how they are updated over the rounds. Figure 7 illustrates our results.
Second, we do a feature attribution experiment which is concerned with discovering features of an input that
are important to a model’s prediction. Particularly, we pick an arbitrary sample from our poisoned validation
set that is correctly classified (as base class) by the model when its trained with FedAvg with RLR, but incor-
rectly classified (as target class) when its trained FedAvg. The result is presented and discussed in Figure 8.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we studied FL from an adversarial perspective, and constructed a simple defense mechanism,
particularly against backdoor attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the second such defense
after [9]. The key idea behind our defense was adjusting the learning rate, per dimension, based on the sign
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Figure 7: Results of parameter attribution experiments. From left-to-right: (a) FedAvg, (b) FedAvg with
RLR in i.i.d. setting, and (c) FedAvg, (d) FedAvg with RLR in non-i.i.d. setting. Net influence is the cumula-
tive sum of differences between the influences of honest agents and the adversarial agents for the mapping of
trojaned samples. As can be seen, net influence is loosely correlated with the backdoor loss. With RLR, net
influence is positive, indicating that honest agents’ influence is greater than adversarial agents. This causes
backdoor loss to increase, and hence, preventing the backdoor. On the other hand, without RLR, net influ-
ence quickly becomes negative and backdoor loss decreases. This results in a successful backdoor attack.
(a) IID setting
(b) Non-IID setting
Figure 8: Feature maps (FM) for i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings on a trojaned sample given by Gradient
SHAP [20]. Leftmost image is the sample input from poisoned validation data, and to its right we present
FMs in the following order: FM of model trained using FedAvg without any attack, FM of model trained
using FedAvg under attack, FM of model trained using FedAvg with RLR under attack. For no attack case,
important pixels are either on or around the actual objects. For i.i.d. setting, model predicts the sample cor-
rectly as sandals with 100% confidence, and for non-i.i.d., model predicts the digit 1 with 99.2% confidence.
For no defense scenario, we can see that model’s attention has shifted towards the trojan pattern. This is
especially very visible for i.i.d. setting where the model almost completely focuses on the trojan. In i.i.d.
case, model predicts the sample as sneakers with 100% confidence, and in non-i.i.d. case, model predicts
the digit as 7 with 91.2% confidence. Finally, we see that with robust learning rate, the model’s attention
has been shifted back to the actual objects to some extent. Now, model predicts the sample as sandals with
100% confidence in i.i.d. case, and it predicts the digit as 1 with 91.2% confidence in non-i.i.d. case.
information of updates coming from the agents. Through experiments we present above and in Appendix B,
we illustrate that our defense reduces backdoor accuracy substantially with a minimal degradation in the
overall validation accuracy, while outperforming recently proposed defenses in the literature. As a final
comment, we believe the insights behind our defense are also related to training in non-i.i.d. setting, even in
the presence of no adversaries. This is due to that fact, differences in local distributions can cause updates
coming from different agents to steer the model towards different directions over the loss surface. As a future
work, we plan to analyze how RLR influences performance of models trained in non-i.i.d. settings in general.
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Appendices
A Hyperparameters of Experiments
We remind the notation we introduced at the beginning of Section 4 and report the hyperparameters of
our experiments. We also briefly discuss our choices.
• R: Number of rounds, K: Total number of agents, F: Fraction of corrupt agents
• P: Fraction of trojaned samples in a corrupt agent’s dataset
• C: Fraction of selected agents for training in a round
• E: Number of epochs in local training, B: Batch size of local training
• η: Server’s learning rate, θ: Threshold for RLR (see equation 4)
R K F P C E B
200 10 0.1 0.5 0.1 2 256
Table 3: Hyperparameters for all i.i.d. experiments. In addition to what is presented in table, we set η
to 1e-3 when sign aggregation is used and to 1 otherwise. Finally, θ is set to 4 when RLR used.
R K F P C E B
500 3383 0.1 0.5 0.01 10 64
Table 4: Hyperparameters for all non-i.i.d. experiments. In addition to what is presented in table, we set
η to 1e-3 when sign aggregation is used and to 1 otherwise. Finally, θ is set to 7 when RLR used.
In both cases, we set E and B to some values that loosely help us to run as many experiments as quickly
as possible in our system. F was arbitrarily fixed to 0.1 so as the values for C. We set P to 0.5 after trying
different values and observing that the backdoor accuracy rises the quickest under that value to simulate a
strong adversary. Setting the value of θ is non-trivial. Technically, it could be any value betweenK.F + 1,
K −K.F . In our experiments, setting it to 4 in i.i.d. setting seemed to provide us the best trade-off
between backdoor prevention and the drop in validation accuracy. For non-i.i.d. setting, in expectation,
we had 3 corrupt agents per round, and setting θ to 7 gave us a similar trade-off as in i.i.d. case.
B Extra Experiments
Regarding our choice of M,σ in i.i.d. case, we observed L2 norm of updates of honest agents during
training in baseline which happened to be floating around 6. So, we ran experiments for M = 6,4,2.
For σ, we tried σ = 1e− 4,1e− 3,5e− 3 and stopped increasing it after observing that training becomes
imbalanced at 5e− 3. For non-i.i.d. case, L2 norm of updates of honest agents were about 1.5− 2, so
we have chosen M = 1,0.5,0.25 and used the same σ values from values from i.i.d. case. In addition
to the plus trojan pattern we used in the main body, we repeated our experiments under three more trojans
which are the same as in [8]: a square, a copyright logo, an Apple logo, placed to the bottom-right of
objects (see Figure 9). We provide explicit results for all possible settings for FedAvg in Tables 7 and
8. For other aggregations, we provide the configuration for the setting where the backdoor accuracy is
the lowest, for each trojan, for sake of brevity in Tables 5 and 6. Results indicate FedAvg combined
with RLR outperforms the other techniques. However, comed and sign also perform well especially
under square,copyright and Apple logo trojans in non-i.i.d. setting(Table 6).Another point to note is, sign
aggregation seems to be performing well with RLR while comed sometimes performs better without it.
C Details of Parameter Attribution Experiment
In this experiment, we quantified influences of corrupt/honest agents as follows. After each round, we find
out the 100 most important parameters for adversarial and honest mapping by computing the empirical
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(a) IID setting
(b) Non-IID setting
Figure 9: Extra trojans patterns from [8] as applied to datasets we use.
Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) as done in [21]. Particularly, we compute the diagonal of FIM on the
trojaned samples, labeled as target class, and take top 100 values for adversarial mapping. We do the same
by computing FIM on trojaned samples labeled as base class to find out the most influential parameters for
honest mapping. Then, due to RLR, some of these top 100 parameters are updated in a way to minimize the
loss, and some of them are updated in a way to maximize the loss. Let S1, S2 be those which are updated to
minimize the loss for adversarial and honest mapping, respectively. Similarly, let S3, S4 be those which are
updated to maximize the loss for adversarial and honest mapping, respectively. Then, we quantified the net
adversarial influence as Iadv = ‖S1\S2‖2 - ‖S3\S4‖2 and the net honest influence as Ihon = ‖S2\S1‖2
- ‖S4 \ S3‖2. Finally, the net influence is then given by Ihon − Iadv which is plotted in blue in Figure 7.
Table 5: Results for comed/sign (left/right) in i.i.d. setting under different trojans.
Trojan Pattern M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
Plus 6 5e-3 No 10.5 85.8 94.0
Square 4 5e-3 No 1.9 88.7 95.9
Copyright 6 5e-3 No 5.7 85.5 95.5
Apple 4 5e-3 No 4.4 88.6 95.9
Trojan Pattern M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
Plus 6 5e-3 Yes 92.1 92.4 98.1
Square 0 1e-3 Yes 4.9 98.2 92.6
Copyright 6 5e-3 Yes 47.7 92.5 98.1
Apple 0 1e-4 Yes 8.5 92.6 98.9
Table 6: Results for comed/sign (left/right) in non-i.i.d. setting under different trojans.
Trojan Pattern M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
Plus 0.5 5e-3 Yes 10.5 94.8 98.1
Square 0.5 1e-4 Yes 0.1 94.9 98.1
Copyright 1 0 No 0.1 96.5 98.3
Apple 0 5e-3 Yes 0.1 96.2 98.4
Trojan Pattern M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
Plus 0.25 1e-3 Yes 54.2 94.6 98.3
Square 0 0 Yes 0 95.4 98.3
Copyright 0 1e-4 Yes 0 94.6 98.6
Apple 0 0 Yes 0 95.4 98.5
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Table 7: Results for FedAvg in i.i.d. setting under different trojans. Top-left/right: plus/square,
bottom-left/right: copyright/Apple logo.
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 1 93.5 98.5
FedAvg 0 0 No 100 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 92.9 98.3
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 100 93.3 98.8
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 92.5 98.0
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 100 93.2 98.4
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 92.4 98.0
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 100 93.2 98.6
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 92.5 98.4
FedAvg 2 0 No 100 93.3 98.8
FedAvg 2 0 Yes 0 92.7 98.0
FedAvg 2 1e-4 No 100 93.5 99.2
FedAvg 2 1e-4 Yes 0 92.9 98.8
FedAvg 2 1e-3 No 100 93.4 98.8
FedAvg 2 1e-3 Yes 0 92.6 98.3
FedAvg 2 5e-3 No 99.8 91.2 97.6
FedAvg 2 5e-3 Yes 4 89.6 95.5
FedAvg 4 0 No 100 93.4 99.0
FedAvg 4 0 Yes 0 93.3 98.3
FedAvg 4 1e-4 No 100 93.6 99.0
FedAvg 4 1e-4 Yes 0 92.9 98.2
FedAvg 4 1e-3 No 100 93.2 99.1
FedAvg 4 1e-3 Yes 0.5 92.2 97.4
FedAvg 4 5e-3 No 99.0 89.0 96.3
FedAvg 4 5e-3 Yes 3.1 87.2 94.0
FedAvg 6 0 No 100 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 6 0 Yes 0 93.0 97.9
FedAvg 6 1e-4 No 100 93.5 99.1
FedAvg 6 1e-4 Yes 0 92.9 98.1
FedAvg 6 1e-3 No 100 93.1 98.6
FedAvg 6 1e-3 Yes 0.5 91.8 97.2
FedAvg 6 5e-3 No 92.3 85.7 93.9
FedAvg 6 5e-3 Yes 6.1 83.9 93.1
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0.7 93.2 99.0
FedAvg 0 0 No 95.0 93.3 98.5
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 92.6 98.5
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 94.9 93.4 98.3
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 92.4 98.3
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 95.9 93.4 98.8
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 92.5 97.9
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 94.0 93.6 99.0
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 92.6 98.3
FedAvg 2 0 No 96.5 93.4 98.9
FedAvg 2 0 Yes 0 92.7 98.4
FedAvg 2 1e-4 No 94.2 93.4 98.7
FedAvg 2 1e-4 Yes 0 92.8 98.1
FedAvg 2 1e-3 No 93.8 93.6 99.3
FedAvg 2 1e-3 Yes 0 92.6 98.0
FedAvg 2 5e-3 No 42.6 91.2 97.5
FedAvg 2 5e-3 Yes 1.4 89.8 96.3
FedAvg 4 0 No 95.0 93.5 98.8
FedAvg 4 0 Yes 0.1 93.2 98.3
FedAvg 4 1e-4 No 93.7 93.5 99.0
FedAvg 4 1e-4 Yes 0 93.4 97.7
FedAvg 4 1e-3 No 94 93.4 99.0
FedAvg 4 1e-3 Yes 0.5 92.3 97.5
FedAvg 4 5e-3 No 33.6 88.8 97.1
FedAvg 4 5e-3 Yes 3.1 87.2 94.0
FedAvg 6 0 No 93.2 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 6 0 Yes 0 93.1 97.7
FedAvg 6 1e-4 No 94 93.4 99.2
FedAvg 6 1e-4 Yes 0 93.1 98.5
FedAvg 6 1e-3 No 94.3 92.9 98.5
FedAvg 6 1e-3 Yes 0.5 91.4 98.1
FedAvg 6 5e-3 No 25.4 85.3 94.5
FedAvg 6 5e-3 Yes 6.1 83.3 88.2
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0.4 93.6 98.8
FedAvg 0 0 No 98 93.3 98.8
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 98.7 92.7 98.3
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 98.0 93.3 98.8
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 92.9 98.2
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 97.6 93.6 98.9
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 92.6 97.9
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 98.9 93.0 99.0
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 93.0 97.6
FedAvg 2 0 No 98.1 93.4 98.9
FedAvg 2 0 Yes 0 92.7 97.8
FedAvg 2 1e-4 No 98.2 93.7 98.7
FedAvg 2 1e-4 Yes 0 92.7 98.4
FedAvg 2 1e-3 No 97.4 93.4 98.8
FedAvg 2 1e-3 Yes 0 92.6 97.5
FedAvg 2 5e-3 No 93.2 91.2 97.1
FedAvg 2 5e-3 Yes 1.5 90.0 96.6
FedAvg 4 0 No 98.7 93.6 99.2
FedAvg 4 0 Yes 0.1 93.1 98.1
FedAvg 4 1e-4 No 97.5 93.4 99.0
FedAvg 4 1e-4 Yes 0 93.1 97.9
FedAvg 4 1e-3 No 98.0 93.0 98.8
FedAvg 4 1e-3 Yes 0 92.1 97.9
FedAvg 4 5e-3 No 94.7 88.7 95.3
FedAvg 4 5e-3 Yes 7.6 86.8 90.5
FedAvg 6 0 No 98.7 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 6 0 Yes 0 93.1 98.1
FedAvg 6 1e-4 No 97.6 93.3 98.8
FedAvg 6 1e-4 Yes 0 93.0 98.2
FedAvg 6 1e-3 No 97.1 93.0 98.5
FedAvg 6 1e-3 Yes 0.5 91.8 97.6
FedAvg 6 5e-3 No 93.9 85.4 91.2
FedAvg 6 5e-3 Yes 9.2 82.8 86.8
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0.4 93.3 98.7
FedAvg 0 0 No 90.1 93.4 98.7
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 92.9 97.6
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 90.7 93.3 99.0
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 92.7 98.2
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 90.8 93.3 98.6
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 92.5 97.8
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 91.3 93.4 98.9
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0.1 92.6 97.7
FedAvg 2 0 No 86.7 93.2 99.1
FedAvg 2 0 Yes 0 92.7 98.2
FedAvg 2 1e-4 No 85.1 93.4 98.8
FedAvg 2 1e-4 Yes 0 92.8 98.1
FedAvg 2 1e-3 No 87.4 93.5 99.0
FedAvg 2 1e-3 Yes 0 92.5 97.9
FedAvg 2 5e-3 No 54.8 91.2 97.7
FedAvg 2 5e-3 Yes 1.5 89.8 97.0
FedAvg 4 0 No 89.5 93.5 99.0
FedAvg 4 0 Yes 0.1 93.0 97.7
FedAvg 4 1e-4 No 88.0 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 4 1e-4 Yes 0 93.2 97.9
FedAvg 4 1e-3 No 84.2 93.3 98.8
FedAvg 4 1e-3 Yes 0.3 92.1 97.4
FedAvg 4 5e-3 No 50.4 88.5 94.2
FedAvg 4 5e-3 Yes 2.6 87.5 96.3
FedAvg 6 0 No 90.6 93.4 99.0
FedAvg 6 0 Yes 0.1 93.2 98.3
FedAvg 6 1e-4 No 89.4 93.3 98.4
FedAvg 6 1e-4 Yes 0 92.5 97.3
FedAvg 6 1e-3 No 91.8 93.0 97.8
FedAvg 6 1e-3 Yes 0.1 92.1 97.7
FedAvg 6 5e-3 No 20.3 85.2 91.7
FedAvg 6 5e-3 Yes 6.1 84.4 91.2
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Table 8: Results for FedAvg in non-i.i.d. setting under different trojans. Top-left/right: plus/square,
bottom-left/right: copyright/Apple logo.
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 0 No 99.5 98.5 98.9
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 95.2 97.7
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 99.6 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 95.3 98.1
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 99.6 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 95.1 98.3
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 99.6 98.5 99.1
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 95.1 98.0
FedAvg 0.25 0 No 99.5 96.7 98.4
FedAvg 0.25 0 Yes 0 90.0 97.0
FedAvg 0.25 1e-4 No 99.6 96.7 98.6
FedAvg 0.25 1e-4 Yes 0 89.8 97.7
FedAvg 0.25 1e-3 No 99.6 96.6 98.3
FedAvg 0.25 1e-3 Yes 0 89.9 96.6
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 No 99.5 96.6 98.5
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 Yes 0 89.8 96.1
FedAvg 0.5 0 No 99.5 98.0 98.8
FedAvg 0.5 0 Yes 0 93.8 97.9
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 No 99.5 98.1 98.8
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 Yes 0 93.7 97.18
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 No 99.5 98.1 98.7
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 Yes 0 93.8 97.5
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 No 99.4 97.7 98.4
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 Yes 0 94.4 97.4
FedAvg 1.0 0 No 99.6 98.4 99.0
FedAvg 1.0 0 Yes 0 94.9 97.8
FedAvg 1.0 1e-4 No 99.4 98.5 98.8
FedAvg 1.0 1e-4 Yes 0 94.8 97.8
FedAvg 1.0 1e-3 No 99.6 98.3 98.9
FedAvg 1.0 1e-3 Yes 0 94.6 97.4
FedAvg 1.0 5e-3 No 99.2 98.5 99.1
FedAvg 1.0 5e-3 Yes 28.4 94.9 97.5
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0.7 93.2 99.0
FedAvg 0 0 No 95.0 93.3 98.5
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 92.6 98.5
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 94.9 93.4 98.3
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 92.4 98.3
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 95.9 93.4 98.8
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 92.5 97.9
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 94.0 93.6 99.0
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 92.6 98.3
FedAvg 0.25 0 No 96.5 93.4 98.9
FedAvg 0.25 0 Yes 0 92.7 98.4
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 No 94.2 93.4 98.7
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 Yes 0 92.8 98.1
FedAvg 0.25 1e-3 No 93.8 93.6 99.3
FedAvg 0.25 1e-3 Yes 0 92.6 98.0
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 No 42.6 91.2 97.5
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 Yes 1.4 89.8 96.3
FedAvg 0.5 0 No 95.0 93.5 98.8
FedAvg 0.5 0 Yes 0.1 93.2 98.3
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 No 93.7 93.5 99.0
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 Yes 0 93.4 97.7
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 No 94 93.4 99.0
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 Yes 0.5 92.3 97.5
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 No 33.6 88.8 97.1
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 Yes 3.1 87.2 94.0
FedAvg 1 0 No 93.2 93.4 98.5
FedAvg 1 0 Yes 0 93.1 97.7
FedAvg 1 1e-4 No 94 93.4 99.2
FedAvg 1 1e-4 Yes 0 93.1 98.5
FedAvg 1 1e-3 No 94.3 92.9 98.5
FedAvg 1 1e-3 Yes 0.5 91.4 98.1
FedAvg 1 5e-3 No 25.4 85.3 94.5
FedAvg 1 5e-3 Yes 6.1 83.3 88.2
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0.1 98.5 99.1
FedAvg 0 0 No 99.5 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 94.9 97.6
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 99.5 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 95.1 97.8
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 99.5 98.5 99.1
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 95.2 97.7
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 99.6 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 95.2 98.1
FedAvg 0.25 0 No 99.4 96.6 98.5
FedAvg 0.25 0 Yes 0 89.3 97.1
FedAvg 0.25 1e-4 No 99.4 96.9 98.6
FedAvg 0.25 1e-4 Yes 0 89.5 97.0
FedAvg 2 1e-3 No 99.3 96.9 98.5
FedAvg 2 1e-3 Yes 0 89.2 96.3
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 No 99.2 96.7 98.4
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 Yes 0 90.2 96.4
FedAvg 0.5 0 No 99.4 98.0 98.9
FedAvg 0.5 0 Yes 0.0 93.2 96.9
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 No 99.5 98.0 98.8
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 Yes 0 93.5 97.7
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 No 99.4 98.1 98.9
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 Yes 0 93.4 96.9
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 No 99.5 97.8 98.5
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 Yes 0 94.3 97.6
FedAvg 1 0 No 99.5 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 1 0 Yes 0 95.1 98.0
FedAvg 1 1e-4 No 99.6 98.4 99.1
FedAvg 1 1e-4 Yes 0 95.0 98.1
FedAvg 1 1e-3 No 99.5 98.4 98.9
FedAvg 1 1e-3 Yes 0 95.0 98.0
FedAvg 1 5e-3 No 99.4 98.0 98.7
FedAvg 1 5e-3 Yes 0 94.9 97.7
Aggregation M σ RLR used? Backdoor (%) Validation (%) Base (%)
FedAvg* 0 0 No 0 98.5 99.1
FedAvg 0 0 No 99.4 98.5 99.1
FedAvg 0 0 Yes 0 95.0 97.6
FedAvg 0 1e-4 No 99.6 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 1e-4 Yes 0 95.4 98.1
FedAvg 0 1e-3 No 99.5 98.4 99.0
FedAvg 0 1e-3 Yes 0 95.0 97.7
FedAvg 0 5e-3 No 99.3 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 0 5e-3 Yes 0 95.2 97.6
FedAvg 0.25 0 No 99.5 96.8 98.6
FedAvg 0.25 0 Yes 0 89.2 97.4
FedAvg 0.25 1e-4 No 99.5 96.5 98.6
FedAvg 0.25 1e-4 Yes 0 89.3 97.0
FedAvg 2 1e-3 No 99.4 97.0 98.5
FedAvg 2 1e-3 Yes 0 89.8 96.4
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 No 99.2 96.4 98.6
FedAvg 0.25 5e-3 Yes 0 90.7 96.7
FedAvg 0.5 0 No 99.5 98.0 98.6
FedAvg 0.5 0 Yes 0.0 93.4 98.2
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 No 99.5 98.0 98.8
FedAvg 0.5 1e-4 Yes 0 93.5 97.7
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 No 99.4 98.0 98.9
FedAvg 0.5 1e-3 Yes 0 93.5 96.9
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 No 99.3 97.8 98.6
FedAvg 0.5 5e-3 Yes 0 94.2 97.2
FedAvg 1 0 No 99.5 98.5 99.0
FedAvg 1 0 Yes 0 95.1 98.0
FedAvg 1 1e-4 No 99.6 98.4 99.0
FedAvg 1 1e-4 Yes 0 94.9 97.8
FedAvg 1 1e-3 No 99.5 98.4 98.7
FedAvg 1 1e-3 Yes 0 94.9 97.9
FedAvg 1 5e-3 No 99.5 97.9 98.6
FedAvg 1 5e-3 Yes 0 94.8 98.0
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